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1Abstract
Using the largest household panel data available in Chile we investigate intergenerational
mobility of income during the decade 1996-2006. Following recent literature we control
our estimates by time-series variation in intergenerational mobility. In addition, we control
for sample selection following new weight adjusting methods proposed for intergenerational
mobility analysis using longitudinal data. Our results indicate low income mobility compared
with developing countries and that income elasticities are higher for men. Furthermore, a
cohort analysis suggests that intergenerational mobility decreased with time.
21 Introduction
This paper investigates intergenerational mobility of income using the ¯rst panel data household
survey available in Chile. We followed Lee and Solon (2006) by modeling time-series variation in
intergenerational mobility and analyzing cohort's di®erences. Our results show a large parameter
of correlation between parents' income and children's income compared to developed countries
which shows low mobility. Cohort's analysis shows mobility is decreasing.
Chile has been pointed out as the best performance country in Latin American. Permanent
growth and a stable macroeconomic policy have allowed Chile's income per capita double in
last decade. On the other hand, Chile's income distribution measures are on the bottom of the
ladder and share with Brazil the worst performance in this dimension in the region. Even more,
Chile has shown that inequality measures had been stable and slightly improved only recently.
Latin America also shows the worst income inequality measures in the word. However, little
is known about other dimensions of inequality such as mobility or inequality of opportunity.
This is due mainly to the lack of longitudinal dataset.
This paper studies intergenerational mobility of income using longitudinal data for the ¯rst
time in Chile. We use the Panel CASEN Survey 1996, 2001 and 2006, the main panel survey of
the country covering a period of 10 years.
Previous attempts of estimating intergenerational mobility in Chile have used cross sections
data sources, none of them being of a longitudinal dimension. For instance, Nu~ nez and Risco
(2004) predict parental income using schooling years declared by daughters/sons in a cross
sectional survey. Whilst education and income tend to be highly correlated, this approximation
to parental income overestimates intergenerational mobility (Sapelli, 2004). Furthermore, Torche
(2005) using data from the Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrialized Countries
(CASMIN) project and a cross section mobility survey conducted in 2001 for Chile has pointed
out Chile as a mobile country: high inequality but high mobility. The main problem with
this paper is that she does not use panel data but self reported positions in the distribution of
income, with similar problems to those of Nu~ nez and Risco (2004) 1. Using longitudinal data
1In a di®erent line of research Contreras et al (2004) investigate poverty dynamics using the ¯rst row of the
same panel data.
3that cover di®erent generations, we present measures of intergenerational mobility of income
that overcomes problems of precision and overestimation.
Availability and access to new data sources together with new developments of analytical and
theoretical models have allowed for new measures of welfare to arise, one of them being income
mobility measures (Jenkins and Micklewright, 2007). While poverty and inequality measures
help to evaluate a country's economic performance in di®erent periods, mobility - income mo-
bility or educational mobility - measures life conditions changes of households more rigorously.
However, precise measures of mobility are not possible without longitudinal data, that allow
researchers to follow same observations over time and examine both individual changes and
transitions between di®erent states - poverty status, deciles of income, levels of education, work
categories, among others. Furthermore, longitudinal data helps to study policy interventions,
develop theoretical models using event history analysis, and control for some non observable
variable biases (Rose, 2000).
This study will cover measures of welfare through a conventional approach of intergenera-
tional mobility of income and educational levels, by examining how strong are relations between
children's income level and parental income level.Finally, the structure of the paper is as follows.
After this section comes section 2 which formulates and explains the econometric models. Then,
section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
2 The Econometric Model
The main relation explored in this this research is that between the household total income of
a child when he or she is dependant, and the household total income of this same child when he
or she becomes a household head. The ¯rst time observation will be refereed as child income in
t = 1, while children income when he or she becomes a household head will be be referred as
child income in t = 2.
The general equation in intergenerational mobility analysis aims to estimate a parameter that
measures how correlated parents' income and children's income are. This way, by estimating the
correlation between child income in t = 1 and child income in t = 2, intergenerational income
4elasticities can be obtained. In terms of linear regression, the ¯rst equation is estimated as
follows,
Yit=2 = ¯0 + ¯1Xit=1 + ²it (2.1)
Where Yit=2 is the income of child i at the time when we observed the child's income when
he or she becomes a household head, and Xit = 1 is parents' income of child i at the time when
we observed parents' income. In this case, ¯1 measures the correlation of parental income and
children's income. Both variables will be expressed in logarithms so that ¯1 can be interpreted
as the intergenerational income elasticity.
Further analysis adds control variables proposed in Lee and Solon (2006) that allow to control
estimates of intergenrational elasticities for life ccycle bias. These variables are the age of the
child when he or she becomes a household head, and its squared, together with the age of the
father when childhood's household total income is observed, and its squared.
We extended this analysis by using the methodology proposed by Lee and Solon (2006) in
which:
Yit=2 = ¯0 +¯1tXit=1 +¯2Ageit=2 +¯3Age2
it=2 +¯4FAgeit=1 +¯5FAge2
it=1 +¯6Y earit=2 +²it=2
(2.2)
Where Ageit=2 is child's age at time his income is observed and Age2
it=2 its squared, FAgeit=1
is father's age at time his income is observed and FAge2
it=1 its squared, Y earit=2 are indicator
variables that are equal to one at the time child's income is observed. One version fo the model
above will be to allow the parameter associated to Xit=1 to vary over each child's cohort. As we
do not have a large dataset we do not have many observations for each cohort, another model
estimates this cohort variation groping the sample in ten year cohorts: 1960-1970, 1970-1980,
and 1980-1990. In addition, declared income in one period may not be a good proxy for life
time income, which would be preferable to estimate initergenerational mobility. to overcome
this issue we estimate the above regression without cohorts using as permanent parental income
5the average income of the parents. In this estimation we use the sample that is observed in
two periods as child and in the last period of the panel, wave 2006, as household heads, thus
reducing our sample size.
Finally, international evidence on the estimation of the elasticity of income between parents
and children show higher mobility in developed countries. However, the relationship with income
inequality is not clear. Table 6 in the Appendix shows di®erent estimates of the parameter of
interest for selected studies.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For the analysis we combined di®erent birth cohorts of children: children born between 1961
and 1981, and children born in 1966 and 1986. The ¯rst group contains sons and daughters in
waves 1996 and 2001 that became household heads in the third wave of the panel, year 2006.
The second group contains sons and daughters in waves 1996 that became household heads or
spouse in 2001 and continued in either of these household categories in the third wave of the
panel, year 2006. Therefore, we observe household total income for both groups when they were
sons or daughters and when they became household heads or spouse.
The original data contains 9,436 children in total in 1996, from which 3,141 belong to the
cohorts de¯ned above. Along with this cohort restriction, the estimation of intergenerational
mobility restricts the sample to those children in the cohorts de¯ned for whom we observe
household income data when they are children, and those children that became household heads
in succeeding waves. Finally, the estimations use a sample size of 1,025 observations.
Francesconi and Nicoletti (2006) estimating intergenerational mobility of occupation for
Britain discuss di®erent solutions for sample selection in these kinds of studies when chil-
dren/father pairs need to be constructed. They estimate OLS equations considering employment
selection and co-residence selection. The former is solved by using Heckman (1979) approach,
while the latter considers the selection on the probability of observing children living with their
father. The estimations in this article do not use occupational income, but total family income
as a measure of wealth, measure that is not bias by employment selection.
6Furthermore, by using family income across time as a measure of wealth the estimations in
this article do not su®er from co-residence selection bias 2. However sample selection in terms of
probability of observing children of cohorts selected as household heads or spouse in succeeding
waves may cause a bias.
To correct for this bias we follow Francesconi and Nicoletti (2006) method of propensity score
weighting, proposed ¯rst by Rubin and Rosenbaum (1984) for correcting the potential bias of
this sample selection procedure. In particular, we model the probability of observing children
in the cohorts selected as household heads or spouse in succeeding waves. We correct original
weights of the panel for this probability and estimate weighted least square equations by OLS
to obtain intergenerational elasticities between family income measures.
When pairs of family income in t = 1 and t = 2 are constructed, those observations that are
children in 1996 and 2001 and become household heads or spouse in 2006 become two di®erent
observations, one being children in 1996 household head or spouse in 2006, and children in 2001
and household head or spouse in 2006. Thus from the 1,025 observations above, the ¯nal number
of observation increases approximately to 1,700.
Given this sample structure we can observe sons' and daughters' household total income in
ages that vary between 9 to 35 years old, and their household total income when they become
household head or spouse in ages between 20 to 45 years old. In the analysis, we follow Lee and
Solon (2006) to consider the e®ects of observing children income over a range of ages, which
may cause a life cycle bias.
Table 1 shows a descriptive statistical analysis of the data with the variables included in
the multivariate analysis. In the period we observe children as sons and daughters (t=1) the
mean age is 20.85 years old (within a range of 9 to 35 years for the cohorts chosen). Children's
household mean total income is of $338,329 Chilean pesos (660 USD), household's head age in
t=1 is around 50 years old, have on average 7-8 years of schooling approximately, and 80% of
household head in the same period are male. When we observe children as household heads or
spouse, their mean age is 28 years old (within a range of 20 to 45 years); they have 12.45 years
2In this article we do not use children/father pairs of observations. Pairs of the kind family income of children
in t=1/family income of children in t=2 are constructed
7of schooling, approximately 44% of them are male, and their household income is on average
$414,329 Chilean pesos (813 USD). All incomes expressed here are in real terms, using 1996 as
the base year.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std Error Obs.
Children age in t=1 20.85 0.22 1695
Children household total income in t=1 338329.60 18867.96 1720
Children log household total income in t=1 12.36 0.04 1708
Household head age in t=1 49.97 0.50 1648
Household head age square in t=1 2597.29 55.65 1648
Household schooling in t=1 7.58 0.22 1553
Household head sex in t=1, dummy=1 if male 0.80 0.02 1717
Children age in t=2 27.97 0.23 1705
Children age square in t=2 808.62 13.15 1705
Children schooling in t=2 12.45 0.15 1645
Children gender in t=2, dummy=1 if male 0.44 0.02 1716
Children household total income in t=2 414329.60 34351.13 1720
Children log household total income in t=2 12.55 0.05 1700
Note: All statistics are calculated using adjusted longitudinal weights for sample election
4 Results
Income mobility can be study through di®erent analysis. One of them is the analysis of positional
movement using mobility matrices to study mobility between two di®erent categories of the same
dimensions (time, generation, geographical, etc.). This way we can study intergenerational
mobility by looking at deciles of income where fathers and children are positioned in the exact
period when we observe their income.
Table 2 shows a mobility matrix for deciles of income, measured as the total household
income. In the rows the table shows the decile of household total income in t = 1, that is
when the child has not yet become a household head. In the columns the table shows the
deciles of household total income when the child becomes a household head. For instance, the
table shows that approximately 29.1% of children whose childhood household was in the ¯rst
8decile of income, remained in this position when they became household heads. Furthermore,
approximately 78% of these children remained in the lowest ¯ve deciles of income.
The table shows that mobility is higher in the middle deciles of income. In the highest deciles
of income, the table shows that while 39.9% of children whose childhood household was in the
tenth decile of income remained in this position when they became household heads, and 85% of
them stayed the top ¯ve income deciles. This results re°ects how mobility decreases as people
move into higher levels of income. It seems that between generations income is more mobile in
lower deciles. This is consistent with the thesis of Torche (2005) that shows Chile as a country
with higher mobility in lower deciles.
Table 2: Mobility matrix of deciles of income
Adult Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Childhood Decile
1 29.1% 21.4% 10.6% 10.4% 6.5% 7.1% 3.9% 4.6% 4.2% 2.3%
2 19.5% 22.1% 13.8% 11.9% 9.2% 7.5% 5.5% 6.2% 2.5% 1.9%
3 13.0% 16.5% 16.8% 12.3% 12.3% 9.2% 7.8% 5.6% 3.7% 3.0%
4 10.7% 11.8% 13.7% 15.5% 11.1% 11.0% 8.8% 8.1% 5.9% 3.6%
5 7.1% 8.8% 10.5% 13.5% 15.1% 12.0% 9.6% 10.5% 7.9% 5.0%
6 7.4% 8.6% 8.6% 11.8% 12.9% 13.3% 12.9% 10.7% 9.1% 4.7%
7 5.2% 6.0% 7.7% 9.4% 10.3% 13.3% 12.9% 13.0% 13.8% 8.4%
8 4.5% 4.3% 5.6% 8.0% 7.9% 11.7% 13.8% 16.1% 15.4% 12.8%
9 2.7% 3.3% 4.0% 6.0% 7.2% 8.9% 16.1% 14.5% 19.3% 18.1%
10 1.3% 2.4% 2.8% 3.8% 4.8% 6.2% 8.9% 10.9% 19.0% 39.9%
Various measures can be obtained from transition or mobility matrices as shown in Table
3. The ¯rst of them shows the percentage of sample members in the diagonal of the mobility
matrix. The table shows that 20% of children when they became household heads belong to
the same decile of income as their childhood household. The next measure shows that 24%
of sample members moved, upwards or downwards, by one decile, while almost 60% of them
moved, upwards or downwards, by two or more deciles.
The next two measures are the Shorrocks MET - Prais Index (Shorrocks 1978) and the Aver-
age Jump measure. The latter measures the average jump between deciles of each observation in
our sample, while the former is an index that ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 is perfect mobility
9of the observations in the sample. The Shorrock's index shows a value of 0.933, showing a low
mobility compared to other developing countries. The average jump shows that children when
they become household heads ,move on average 2.4 deciles, upwards or downwards, from their
childhood household income decile.
Table 3: Income mobility matrix measures
Percentage on diagonal 20%
Percentage that moved by one decile 26.6%
Percentage that moved by two or more deciles 53%
Shorrocks' MET-the Prais index 0.933
Average Jump 2.467
Following the descriptive analysis and transition matrices for income mobility, we now present
results from the regressions presented in section 2. The complete results of the regression are
available in the appendix: Model 1 in Table 7, Model 2 in Table 8, Model 3 in Table 9 and Model
4 in Table 10. . Here we present a summary table for the regressions of income mobility. Section
3 discussed sample selection issues that arose from the sample selection process followed for this
research. Original sample weights were adjusted by this selection process. The coe±cients shown
are estimated using these adjusted longitudinal weights.
Furthermore, we include controls progressively to see the changes in the relevant parameter
associated to household in t = 1, though the results reported in this paper show coe±cient of
regressions with all controls included: age of the child when his or her income as adult is observed,
this same age squared, age of the father when childhood household income is observed, this age
squared and a dummy for year to control for time speci¯c e®ects. We also present results for all
sample, only sons and only daughters. We recall that the higher the parameter the lower the
intergenerational mobility. As we present before, in the international literature this parameter
is in general low in Scandinavian countries, is higher in the US and much higher in Brazil, for
example3.
3see Table 6 in the appendix
10Table 4 shows the childhood/adult elasticities for income estimated from equations in section
2. The ¯rst row of table 4 shows an intergenerational income elasticity of 50% for the full sample.
The next two columns show this same regression for the sub sample of sons and daughters. As
the results show, di®erences in mobility between sex are noticeable. For instance, while the
child/adult elasticity of income is of 60.8% for men, women have an intergenerational income
elasticity of 40%. This di®erence in 20 percentage points suggests that women are more mobile
than men when it comes to intergenerational income mobility. That is, women tend to have
better outcomes in terms of income mobility than men once they leave their child status in the
household. All parameters in Model 1 are statistically signi¯cant. The three parameters shown
are higher than those of Lee and Solon (2006) for the US4.
Table 4: Summary table of log-income mobility elasticities: ¯1
All Sample Sons Daughters
Model 1 0.500*** 0.608*** 0.400***
Model 3 0.479*** 0.562*** 0.404***
Cohort 70 - 80 0.014 0.027 -0.008
Cohort 80 - 90 0.023 0.034 -0.003
Model 4 0.633*** - -
Note: *** p·0.01, ** p·0.05, * p·0.1
All Control variables included
To study time variant e®ects of income mobility, model 2 estimated the same regressions
interacting the log of income with a dummy for each cohort in the data. Table 5 shows the
cohort sampling distribution. The cohorts included in this regression are 1966 - 1986, due to
low sample sizes in other cohorts. Figure 1 shows how income elasticity varies according to the
year of birth. Like Lee and Solon (2006), these results are controled for life cycle bias, by adding
age and age square of both child and father in the regression. The ¯gure shows the results
for the whole sample, sons and daughters. On average, intergenerational mobility of incccome
has decreased on time. The coe±cient estimated is higher for younger cohorts. Furthermore,
4Lee and Solon (2006) ¯nd parameters of 30%. However the cohort analysis showed a wide range of results,
up to 60% for income elasticities.
11di®erences between men and women remain no matter the cohort, though the gender gap has
decreased with time. This is mainly due to the fact that women has become less mobile in terms
of income relative to men.
Model 3 estimates the cohort analysis, using aggregated cohorts. The sample was separated
in three cohorts: born between 1960-1970, born between 1970-1980, and born between 1980 -
1990. The base group is the oldest cohort. The coe±cients shown in Table 4 show that for
the whole sample mobility has decreased. In fact, the coe±cient is higher for cohort 80 - 90,
50.2% compared to 49.3% in cohort 70 -80, and 47.9% for the base cohort. When this equation
is estimated for the sub sample of men, a larger mobility coe±cient is obtained, and cohort
di®erences are higher as well. For the sub sample of women the opposite results are obtained:
higher mobility and small changes between aggregated cohorts. Finally, when we estimate
intergenerational mobility using parental permanent income, we obtained lower mobility than
models estimated before, the elasticity using permanent income is 63%. This suggest that using
one period of income to estimate mobility underestimates the parameter of mobility.
Figure 1: Model 2: Cohort income elasticities for all sample, sons and daughters
































This paper investigates intergenerational mobility of income using the longest panel data house-
hold survey available in Chile. We followed Lee and Solon (2006) by modeling time-series vari-
ation in intergenerational mobility and analyzing cohort's di®erences. Our results show a large
parameter of correlation between parents' income and children's income compared to developed
countries which shows low mobility. In addition, cohort's analysis shows mobility is decreasing
as younger cohorts appear to be less mobile than older ones. This results are consistent with
the fact that income inequality has remained stable in the last years, as higher mobility is cor-
related with lower levels of inequality. The results obtained range from 50% to 63% of income
elasticity when the whole sample is used. When the sub samples of men and women are used
13for estimations, the results show higher mobility for women than for men.
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156 Appendix
Table 6: Intergenerational Income elasticities
OLS IV Cohort Source
Germany 0.11 - 0.34 Couch and Dunn (1997), Wiegand (1997)
Brazil 0.53 - 0.54 0.54 - 0.74 Dunn (2003)
Canada 0.12 - 0.19 Corak y Heisz (1995)
Chile 0.54 0.58 N¶ u~ nez y Risco (2004)
Spain 0.24 0.44 S¶ anchez (2004)
USA 0.29 - 0.49 0.44-0.53 Solon (1992)
USA 0.2 - 0.6 yes Lee and Solon (2006)
Finland 0.13 Osterbacka (2001)
France 0.41 0.44 Lefrane y Trannoy (2004)
UK 0.43 0.57 Dearden, Machin, and Reed (1997)
Italy 0.36 Checchi (1997)
Malaysia 0.26 Lilland and Kilburn (1995)
South Africa 0.44 Solon (2002), Solon (2006)
Sweeden 0.13 Osterberg (2000)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1718Table 8: Model 2: OLS of Child Income in t=2. Cohort Analysis
Variables All Sample Sons Daughters
Original Weights Adjusted Weights Original Weights Adjusted Weights Original Weights Adjusted Weights
Income in t=1 0.418*** 0.421*** 0.467*** 0.477*** 0.337*** 0.316***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.078) (0.076) (0.085) (0.078)
Cohort 2 0.013 0.002 0.022 0.014 -0.064** -0.062**
(0.032) (0.028) (0.034) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027)
Cohort 3 0.043** 0.041** 0.048* 0.040* 0.040 0.041
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029)
Cohort 4 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.018 0.004 0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Cohort 5 0.037 0.040 0.067* 0.078** -0.007 -0.004
(0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033)
Cohort 6 0.024 0.026 -0.007 0.007 0.049 0.052
(0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.034)
Cohort 7 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.035
(0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.048) (0.043) (0.041)
Cohort 8 0.062 0.068 0.063 0.084 0.063 0.071*
(0.050) (0.051) (0.064) (0.065) (0.045) (0.042)
Cohort 9 0.002 0.005 0.016 0.038 0.008 0.012
(0.044) (0.046) (0.061) (0.063) (0.049) (0.046)
Cohort 10 0.034 0.036 0.020 0.039 0.070 0.074
(0.051) (0.053) (0.067) (0.069) (0.056) (0.053)
Cohort 11 0.016 0.021 0.016 0.047 0.033 0.036
(0.054) (0.055) (0.071) (0.074) (0.060) (0.056)
Cohort 12 0.042 0.048 0.039 0.072 0.067 0.072
(0.058) (0.060) (0.078) (0.081) (0.063) (0.059)
Cohort 13 0.052 0.058 0.029 0.069 0.095 0.097
(0.063) (0.066) (0.084) (0.087) (0.068) (0.064)
Cohort 14 0.034 0.044 0.039 0.080 0.066 0.077
(0.069) (0.071) (0.096) (0.099) (0.075) (0.070)
Cohort 15 0.044 0.051 0.032 0.073 0.084 0.090
(0.071) (0.074) (0.096) (0.099) (0.077) (0.072)
Cohort 16 0.045 0.054 0.005 0.048 0.099 0.105
(0.076) (0.079) (0.102) (0.106) (0.082) (0.077)
Cohort 17 0.058 0.068 0.060 0.096 0.101 0.111
(0.081) (0.084) (0.108) (0.111) (0.088) (0.082)
Cohort 18 0.063 0.068 0.038 0.091 0.126 0.128
(0.086) (0.090) (0.119) (0.124) (0.090) (0.086)
Cohort 19 0.058 0.066 0.056 0.109 0.122 0.132
(0.093) (0.096) (0.125) (0.130) (0.101) (0.093)
Cohort 20 0.064 0.075 0.085 0.143 0.126 0.137
(0.097) (0.101) (0.131) (0.136) (0.105) (0.097)
Cohort 21 0.074 0.079 0.049 0.112 0.159 0.165
(0.101) (0.105) (0.139) (0.145) (0.110) (0.102)
Age of child in t=2 0.180* 0.184* 0.146 0.162 0.342*** 0.354***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.142) (0.149) (0.125) (0.122)
Age of child squared in t=2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age of Household Head in t=1 0.008 -0.009 -0.059 -0.053 0.074* 0.061
(0.028) (0.031) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042)
Age of Household Head in t=1 squared -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy =1 for year 2001 -0.033 -0.002 -0.016 0.123 0.270 0.320
(0.296) (0.310) (0.396) (0.416) (0.328) (0.306)
Weight imputation -0.065 0.332 -0.254
(0.133) (0.205) (0.163)
Constant 3.638* 3.787* 5.373** 3.910 -0.431 -0.145
(2.191) (2.272) (2.720) (2.947) (2.739) (2.746)
Number of observations 1,539 1,539 668 668 867 867
R2 0.336 0.335 0.428 0.441 0.339 0.334
Note: *** p·0.01, ** p·0.05, * p·0.1
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